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COMMENTS
Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools For Biotechnology: A
Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning
Biotechnology Patent Pools

Bradley J. Levang

I.

INTRODUCTION

Patent pools have a long and controversial history in the United
States. Some laud patent pools as a way to further innovation and
development in various industries.1 Supporters credit them for
promoting development in areas where the presence of multiple
patents may impede product development and innovation. 2 Some of
the larger industries within the United States, such as aircraft and3
automobile manufacturing owe their beginnings to patent pools.
Recently, MPEG compression and DVD technology successfully used4
patent pools to help overcome their intellectual property holdups.
The successful use of patent pools in these high profile products has
rekindled interest in patent pools as a way of overcoming patent
bottlenecks. 5
In December 2000, the United States Patent and Trademark
t Bradley J,Levang is a 2003 J.D. Candidate at Santa Clara University School of Law.
He received a B.S. in Animal Science from Cornell University in 2000. Comments are
encouraged and can be sent to the author at BJL9@CORNELL.EDU. The author gratefully
acknowledges Professor Janice Mueller for her editorial assistance.
I. Jeanne Clark et al., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Pools: A
Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? 4 (2000),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
2. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting,INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
MIT Press, 2001), available at http://haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/thicket.pdf.
3. Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 840 (1999).
4. See id.
at 841.
5. Clark, supranote 1,at 8.
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Office (USPTO) published a white paper suggesting patent pools as a
possible solution to problems within the field of biotechnology. 6 The
white paper analyzed bottlenecks and accessibility problems
associated with too many companies holding too many genomic
patents.7 The USPTO claimed patent pools would not only alleviate
these problems, but also confer additional advantages to pool
members.8
This Comment disputes the USPTO's proposition that the use of
patent pools will benefit the biotechnology sector. Specifically, this
paper evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of applying patent
pools to genomic intellectual property, arriving at the conclusion that
patent pools will not be as beneficial to the biotechnology sector as
they were for other industries.
This Comment will further demonstrate the unique nature of the
biotechnology industry that makes patent pools inadequate for
overcoming intellectual property problems within the field. Patent
pools formed in the biotechnology sector face not only traditional
disadvantages but also new concerns exclusive to the industry itself.
Part II provides background on the biotechnology industry. Part III
introduces the current intellectual property related problems facing
biotechnology. Part IV of this Comment provides a background of
the historical use of patent pools. Part V summarizes the advantages
the USPTO believes companies in the biotechnology sector will
realize if they use patent pools to solve issues arising from genomic
patenting. The remainder of this Comment discusses the proposed
advantages that the USPTO claims are inherent to patent pooling and
identifies additional problems associated with the application of
patent pools that are unique to the biotechnology industry.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY AND
GENOMIC INNOVATION
Biotechnology is "the use of the cellular and molecular processes
to solve problems or make products." 9
The United States
biotechnology industry began in the 1980's but did not rapidly expand

6.
7.
8.

See id.at 11.
See id.
See id.

9.
ERNST & YOUNG ECONOMICS CONSULTING AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, THE
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 3,

(prepared
for
the
Biotechnology
http://www.bio.org/news/ernstyoung.pdf (2000).

Industry

Organization),

at
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From 1993 to 1999, the United States
until the 1990s.10
biotechnology industry grew from $8 billion to $20 billion in annual
revenue. 1 Today, there are approximately 100 products on the
market derived from biotechnology.12
Numerous companies are driving this innovation. Depending on
the criteria used, the number of biotechnology companies range from
800 to 1,500 companies within the United States.1 3However, the
endless creation of new companies, mergers, acquisitions, and
differing ideas about what 4qualifies as a "biotechnology" company
hampers an accurate count.
Arguably, the biotechnology industry, as well as the many
arguments about patenting genes, began with Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.'5
Traditionally, the "product of nature" theory
prevented inventors from patenting natural material.' 6 This meant
that companies were prevented from patenting such things as animals,
DNA, or microbes. However, in the 1980 landmark case of Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that human-made,
genetically engineered bacteria that broke down crude oil were
patentable. 17
In reaching this decision, the court cited a
Congressional committee report which indicated, "Congress intended
statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is
made by man."'" 18 This decision lowered the bar prohibiting the
patenting of a "product of nature." Subsequent cases further limited
and, ultimately, allowed for the possibility of patenting DNA based
innovations. 19
For example, in the early 1990s, the USPTO began the patenting
of expressed sequence tags (EST), "short sequences of coding DNA
derived... from messenger RNA extracted from cells. '' 20 During the
1990s, biotechnology companies began rapidly increasing in
numbers, as well as the amount of patent applications they were
10. Id. at 2.
See id at 3.
11.
12. Id.
13. Jennifer Van Brunt, The Numbers Game, SIGNALS, Dec. 13, 2000, at
http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf.
14. Id.
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
16. Ken Garber, Homestead 2000: The Genome, SIGNALS (Mar. 3, 2000), at
http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf.
17. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
18. Id. at310.
19. Garber, supra note 16.
20.

Id.
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filing.2 ' Once expressed sequence tags were deemed patentable, the
USPTO was inundated by such patent applications.
Relatively easy
to isolate in large numbers, ESTs are useful for identifying protein
encoding regions on a strand of DNA.2 3 However, ESTs themselves
are not overly informative.24 Nevertheless, there are currently three
million patent applications for various ESTs.25 Companies are also
filing thousands of patent applications on partial and complete human
genes.26 Consequently, patent applications now cover the entire
human genome and in many instances competing companies are filing
patents applications for identical or overlapping regions of the
genome.27

III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROBLEMS FACING THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY

This section illustrates how the existence of numerous patent
rights in the biotechnology sector hampers companies desiring to
develop products utilizing biotechnology. In his article, attorney
Raymond Fersko summed up the issue by stating:
Biotechnology is a field that has grown through collaborative
efforts. It is rare that one company possesses all the patents,
technical information and know-how necessary to develop a
21.
See supra note 16.
22. Id.
23.
Jeremy
Buhler,
Glossary
of
Biotechnology
Terms,
at
http://www.cs.wustl.edu/-jbuhler/research/array/glossary.html (last modified Aug. 27, 2002).
24. Id.
25.
Garber, supra note 16.
26. To illustrate,
Human Genome Sciences has filed applications encompassing 7,500 fulllength human genes, according to chairman and CEO Bill Haseltine.
Incyte has at least 6,500 genes waiting. Celera Genomics, before it
stopped releasing patent numbers, accounted for another 6,500 partial and
complete genes. Hyseq has disclosed filings for over 5,000 full-length
genes. French genomics company Genset SA is also a major player. As
of last October, it had generated over 90,000 sequences of 5-prime untranslated region (UTR) sequence tags of human full-length cDNA
clones-each tag belonging to a different gene. Patent applications will be
filed on all of them, if they're not already... Even without full-length
genes, as long as possession of the 5-prime UTR sequence is enough to
claim, or "dominate" (in patent law parlance) the gene, then Genset
already has most of the 100,000-plus human genes accounted for in its
patent applications.
27.

Id.
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product and, even if it does, it may need another company's
regulatory expertise and/or manufacturing and/or distribution
28
capability to bring a product from the lab bench to the market.
A. Problems Associated with OverlappingPatentRights
A biotech company often encounters blocking, complementary,
or competing patents that impede their ability to produce end
products.29 The problem of a blocking patent begins when someone is
granted a patent and another person subsequently receives a patent
improving on the original patent.3 ° When the second patent cannot be
utilized without infringing on the first patent, and likewise, the first
patent cannot be used without infringing on the second patent, the two
patents are said to block one another. 3 1 A classic example of blocking
patents occurred in the early 1900s with airplane wing flaps. 32 The
Wright brothers were granted a patent for one method of varying the
length of wings to help in stabilizing flight.33 Later, Glenn Curtiss
developed and patented wing flaps, which quickly became the
preferred, and consequently, dominant method for stabilizing
airplanes.34 Unfortunately for Curtiss, his patent was found to be
blocked by the Wright patent. 35 This resulted in a situation where
Curtiss was unable to sell his wing flaps because they infringed on the
Wright patent and the Wright brothers could not sell their wing flaps
36
because the aircraft industry preferred the wing flaps of Curtiss.
Therefore, the two patents blocked one another and hampered efforts
by either party to take advantage of their respective inventions.37
Another problem that arises in the production of complex
products is complementary, or stacking, patents. In this situation,
multiple patents from different inventors are needed to create the
Fersko's previous explanation of a
ultimate end product.38
28.
Raymond S. Fersko, Bionegotiation: Points to Considerin Negotiating Research and
Development Agreements - Part I, JOURNAL OF BIOLAW & BUSINESS 4 (2001), at

http://www.biolawbusiness.com/abstract4-4.html.
29. Garber, supra note 16.
30. Steven Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
363 (1999).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Carlson, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 365.
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biotechnology company illustrates the complements problem. There,
a company desiring to create a marketable end product must procure
numerous patent rights from others to possess all the steps necessary
to produce the end product. This collection of patents is known as
complementary since each patent is necessary to achieve the end
39
result.
Unlike blocking or complementary patents that create hurdles for
an end product, competing patents increase the options a company
may employ for producing its product.40 Since designing around an
existing patent is one of the cornerstones of innovation underlying the
American patent system, competing patents are a natural extension of
this incentive.41
With competing patents, different valid patents
compete with one another in providing alternate ways to reach the
42
same result.
B. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
The multitude of granted and pending patent applications for
various genes and DNA fragments has created a problem within the
biotechnology industry that Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
have termed the "tragedy of the anticommons. '43 With respect to
gene fragments:
The problem we identify is distinct from the routine underuse
inherent in any well-functioning patent system. By conferring
monopolies on discoveries, patents necessarily increase prices and
restrict use - a cost society pays to motivate invention and
disclosure. The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more
complex obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple
patent inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream
patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to
product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation.4 4
The tragedy of the anticommons claims that the difficulty with
numerous patent rights is the high cost associated with combining
numerous patent rights into a usable whole, thus hampering utilization
39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 75 (2d ed. 2001).

42.

Carlson, supranote 30, at 365.

43.
Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
Patent
Pools
6
(Aug.
1999),
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf.
44.

Id.
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of the patents.45
With few granted patents and numerous applications awaiting
approval, the tragedy of the anticommons is already starting to plague
the industry.46 Joffre Baker, VP of research and discovery for
Genentech Inc., voices the frustration over what the ever increasing
numbers of blocking and stacking patents and royalties bring to the
industry, "[t]here are more patents than ever out there around
processes, methods, various tricks. The royalties just keep on stacking
up and up... The problem will only grow as more genes and ESTs
are patented. 47
In addition to frustrating research, the problem of patent stacking
is pushing royalties for end products up into the ten to fifteen percent
range.48 Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project
summed up the problems associated with the anticommons in the
biotechnology industry:
[N]obody wants to travel the road any more. There are so many
tolls, there are so many complicated patent and licensing
arrangements, there are so many royalty fees attached, that doing
any really interesting experiments, where you may want to draw
several discoveries together, and push ~ourself a little further down
the road, just isn't worth it any more.
Companies attempting to produce a product are all too aware of
the complications which blocking or complementary patents create.
Therefore, many companies search for ways to either streamline or
by-pass these problems. Anticommons theorists have offered several
solutions to the dilemma of the anticommons, including
stricter utility
50
requirements before granting patents and patent pools.
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT POOLS

A patent pool is formed when multiple patent holders combine
their patents into a single entity that then licenses the bundle of
patents to themselves and third parties. 5 ! Patent pools expand upon
the idea of a cross-license, where two parties agree to let the other use
their patents, by usually involving more than two parties and creating
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.at 10.
See Garber, supranote 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Merges, supranote 43, at 7 & 10.
Shapiro, supranote 2.
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a system where third parties can buy the right to use the pool of
patents. 52 Patent pools are often seen as an advantageous way for
multiple patent holders to overcome the problems of blocking or
complementary patents.5 3
The patent pool was first implemented in the United States in
1856 . Ten years earlier, Elias Howe patented a lockstitch machine
that was much faster than manual stitching. 55 Several years after the
invention, Isaac Singer and Allen Wilson were independently using
Howe's lockstitch device, in conjunction with improvements of their
own. 56 In 1856, after Howe filed an infringement lawsuit, the three
men settled the litigation by pooling their patents into the Sewing
Machine Combination which allowed shared use of all their patents
for the production of sewing machines 7 The advantages of patent
pooling quickly became apparent as Howe's annual income from his
one patent went from three hundred dollars to two hundred thousand
dollars after the formation of the Sewing Machine Combination. 58
A.

The TraditionalAdvantages of Using Patent Pools

Since the original patent pool of the Sewing Machine
Combination, several other patent pools have been created in the
United States. In 1917, with the advent of war and the Wright
Brothers and Curtiss Company arguing over their blocking patents, a
committee created by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy urged the
two companies to pool their patents. 59 These companies, among
others, formed the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, a patent pool
combining all the necessary patents needed to build airplanes.6 °
Another successful patent pool was the creation of the Associated
Radio Manufacturers. 6 1 This patent pool combined the relevant
patents of American Marconi, General Electric, American Telephone
and Telegraph, and Westinghouse, into a company which

52.
53.
54.

See id. at 9.
See id. at 17.
See Merges, supranote 43, at 18.

55.

LIBRARY

OF

CONGRESS,

INVENTOR

http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/juI09.html (2002).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Clark, supra note 1, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id.

OF

THE

SEWING

MACHINE,

at
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standardized television and radio parts.62
Patent pools are not just a tool of the past, however. Over the
years, they have been used in products ranging from bathtubs, seeded
raisins, movie projectors, davenport beds and more recently, for
MPEG compression and DVD technology.63 The patent pool for the
MPEG-2 standard was formed in 1997 using 27 patents from the
Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu, General Instrument, Lucent
Technologies, Matsushita Electric Industrial, Mitsubishi Electric,
Philips Electronics, Scientific Atlanta, and Sony. 64 MPEG technology
conserves space and reduces transmission time by compressing
information within binary data streams, with the "-2" denoting the
current version of the MPEG compression standard.65 When forming
this patent pool, the members searched over 8,800 domestic and
foreign patents and began the pool with only 27 patents deemed
essential to the functioning of the MPEG standard.66 The members of
the pool formed MPEG-LA as the administrative entity responsible
for collecting royalties, licensing to third parties, and administrating
the patent pool.67 The pooling of these patents allows numerous
devices such as televisions, computers, and other media delivery
systems to more efficiently transfer data. 68 All of these patent pools
enabled innovation to reach the marketplace that otherwise might
69
have been prevented by blocking or complementary patents.
B. The TraditionalDisadvantagesof Using PatentPools
While patent pools can overcome patent roadblocks, reduce
transaction costs, and promote information exchange, they are also
breeding grounds for abuse.7 ° In 1902, the Supreme Court ruled in E.
Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company that patent law
superceded antitrust regulations. 71 As a result of this decision,
companies began forming patent pools that created monopolies in

62. Id.
63.
Merges, supra note 43, at 18 & 25.
64. See Clark, supra note 1,at 4.
65. See id. at 13. ("The technology in MPEG-2 compresses digital information by
reducing spatial and temporal redundancies in the binary data streams, thereby conserving
transmission resources and storage spaces").
66. Id. at 13-14.
67. Id. at 13.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 13-16.
70. See Clark, supra note 1,at 11.
71.
E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company, 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
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various industries and the federal government was unable to apply the
Sherman Act for breaking these monopolies.72 Not until the 1912
case of StandardSanitary ManufacturingCo. v. United States, did the
Supreme Court reverse the invincibility of the patent monopoly,
ruling that the federal government was entitled to end monopolies that
resulted from collusive patent pools. 73 In that case, a patent pool
prices and impose
revolving around enamelware was used to set sales
74
restrictions on who could purchase the product.
Standard Sanitary Manufacturing started the shifting stance on
the absolute monopoly power of patents and was followed by
subsequent cases which overturned numerous patent pools as being
too monopolistic. 75 For example, in 1945 the Supreme Court
dissolved the glass manufacturing patent pool, which controlled 94%
of America's glass production, in Hartford-Empire Company v.
United States.76 After such cases, the opinion of patent pools being
impervious to antitrust laws had become reversed. Instead, patent
After the 1960s
pools were now viewed quite skeptically. 77
No-Nos," a list
"Nine
publication of the Department of Justice's
opposing nine patent licensing practices, patent pools nearly
disappeared from the business landscape.7 8
In 1995, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission softened their stance against patent pools in their
publication, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, and suggested that patent pools might be beneficial for
today's global economy. 79 These guidelines set out several situations
where patent pools could be advantageous. 80 According to the
guidelines, patent pools are acceptable and pro-competitive when
they integrate complementary technology, reduce transaction costs,
clear blocking patents, avoid infringement litigation, and promote the
dissemination of technology.

72.

Carlson, supra note 30, at 374.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 375.

76.

Hartford-Empire Company v. United States, 323 U.S. 386

77.

Carlson, supranote 30, at 375.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 376.

See Clark, supra note 1, at 6.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST
81.
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm.
80.
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V. THE APPLICATION OF PATENT POOLS TO THE BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY
In the white paper, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of
Access in Biotechnology Patents?,the USPTO addressed the problem
of restricted access to genetic information and resources.82 The
USPTO proposed patent pools as a possible solution to the problems
associated with patent rights in the biotechnology industry.
The
USPTO claimed four distinct advantages of using patent pools to
overcome the problems plaguing the biotechnology industry.
A.

USPTO ClaimedAdvantages of UsingPatent Pools in the
Biotechnology Industry

First, the USPTO claims that the use of patent pools can
overcome the problems associated with blocking and stacking patents
in the biotechnology sector.84 As previously mentioned, numerous
biotechnology companies have patent applications for a multitude of
ESTs, genes, and other DNA fragments. 85
Combining these
numerous patents into a patent pool will overcome the blocking and
stacking problems encountered by proposed end products. 86 Once
formed, such patent pools will also have the secondary benefits of
prompting further innovation and simplifying the process of obtaining
patents necessary for a particular project.8 7
The second benefit conferred by patent pools is the reduction of
licensing transaction costs. 8 8 One billion dollars annually is spent on
patent litigation in the United States. 89 By putting all the relevant
patents into an accessible patent pool, companies will save money and
resources because they will be less likely to litigate over issues
regarding their patent rights. 90 Given the large risk of having the
court invalidate one or perhaps both parties patents, patent pooling
seems to be an attractive option for reducing litigation costs and
maintaining patents. 91 In addition to litigation savings, patent pools

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Clark, supranote 1, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Garber, supra note 16.

87.

Clark, supranote 1, at 8.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Carlson, supranote 30, at 380.
Id.

91.

Id.

240 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19

will address the issue of complementary patents. In short, a patent
pool will save a company time and money by reducing the transaction
costs of negotiating and securing the rights of numerous patents from
multiple companies for use in their end products.
Distribution of risks is the third benefit the USPTO claims
biotechnology companies receive from patent pools. 92 Patent pooling
distributes royalties to all the members helping to ensure that they
profit or at least recoup a significant amount of the costs of their
research efforts.93 Given the large costs involved in research and
development, patent pools are attractive for biotechnology businesses
"distributes risk and provides greater access
because the patent pool
94
technology.
to related
The final proposed advantage a patent pool grants biotechnology
companies is an increase in the sharing of technical information, not
disclosed in the patents, amongst the pool members. 95 The USPTO
suggests that companies will be more likely to discuss their projects
and exchange information to prevent the duplication of efforts under
this scheme.9 6 Since member companies have an equal right in the
use of the pool's patents, exchange of information will prevent
members from squandering valuable resources caused by duplicating
their efforts.
B.

The Biotechnology Industry Will Not Realize the USPTO
Claimed Advantages of Using Patent Pools

In the USPTO white paper, several advantages were laid out for
forming patent pools in the biotechnology sector. 97 These claimed
advantages are nothing more than the common advantages listed for
any patent pool, which have long been proven and are reiterated in the
98
FTC's Antitrust Guidelinesfor Licensing of Intellectual Property.
However, the USPTO fails to recognize the enormous obstacles
biotechnology firms must overcome to form patent pools. These
obstacles decrease the advantages which other industries, using patent

92.

Clark, supra note 1, at 9.

93.

Id.

94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.

97.

Clark, supra note 1, at 10.

98.

"In

particular, the

IP Guidelines

state

that intellectual

property pooling

is

procompetitive when it: (1) integrates complementary technologies, (2) reduces transaction
costs, (3) clears blocking positions, (4) avoids costly infringement litigation, and (5) promotes
the dissemination of technology." Id. at 6.
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This section examines those obstacles facing
pools, realized.
biotechnology companies.
A significant advantage of a patent pool lies in overcoming the
problem of blocking patents. 99 Given the number of granted DNA
patents and the vast number of patent applications for DNA
fragments, blocking patents are a legitimate concern in the
biotechnology industry.' 0 0 However, this problem may not be as
significant as the USPTO white paper claims because despite the
countless number of patent applications, experts believe that most of
these patent applications will never be granted. 1 1 Given the myriad
patent applications for DNA fragments, very few of these applications
have been granted. 10 2 To date, the USPTO has only granted about
2,000 full-length gene patents. 10 3 Gene databases like Merck, the
Institute for Genomic Research, and the Human Genome Project will
further reduce the number of granted genomic patents by placing
genomic information into the public domain. 104 These databases
were created too late, however, to invalidate many of the earlier filed
EST patent applications.'0 5
Adding further uncertainty into the granting of these patents, in
2001 the USPTO announced new, stricter guidelines for granting
patents on ESTs. 10 6 Many pending applications will likely not survive
the more stringent utility requirements which will also decrease the
number of genetic patents. 10 7 And of those applications that survive
the more stringent USPTO utility requirements and are issued as
patents, experts believe that relatively few of them will have any real
utility, much less value.' 0 8 The high costs associated with successfully
prosecuting patent applications and maintaining the granted patents
on thousands of DNA fragments will also reduce the number of
genetic patents. 109 With this large expense, companies will probably
only pay to maintain those patents which serve the goals of the

99. Id. at 6.
100. See Garber, supranote 16.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Jennifer Van Brunt, The Next Move in the Patent Game, SIGNALS (April 26,
2001), at http://www.signaismag.com/signalsmag.nsf.
107. Id.
108. See Carlson, supra note 30, at 385; Van Brunt, supra note 106.
109. Van Brunt, supra note 106.
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company, letting the other patents lapse.110
The inevitable decrease in the number of DNA fragment patents
granted will help lessen the problem of blocking patents, but the
biotechnology industry will still face this problem and look for ways
of solving the problem. When faced with a problem of blocking
patents, the industry traditionally used cross-licensing instead of
patent pools to clear blocking patents."'
In addition to crosslicensing, companies often ignore blocking patents and continue to
produce products that may infringe others' patents.'1 2 Since the value
of many patents is less than the cost of successfully litigating against
infringers, many products are produced which infringe on other's
patents."1 3 Given that the number of genome patents will be less than
the current number of applications and the presence of several
alternate methods, patent pools are not the sole, or even traditional,
solution to the problem of blocking patents.
The second mentioned advantage of a biotechnology pool is the
economic gains from reduced litigation costs. 114 However, the costs
of initially forming, and maintaining, a patent pool should be
considered in determining the economic benefits of a patent pool.
Initial patent pool formation is often a very costly endeavor. 1 5 In the
MPEG-LA patent pool, this high cost was paid in anticipation that the
use of the MPEG compression standard in several mass produced
consumer devices such as televisions, DVD players, and cable and
satellite services would yield high profits and thus justify the initially
116
large outlay of capital and resources to form the patent pool.
Contrary to patent pools for mass produced items like radios or
devices utilizing MPEG technology, biotechnology patent pools
would likely have limited uses and applications for a wide array of
products or services.' 17
Thus, the high cost of forming a
biotechnology patent pool, probably of limited application for pool
members or third parties, might be higher than the cost of potential
litigation." 8 Therefore, the cost savings of litigation would be of little
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advantage to a biotechnology company that ends up spending more
money forming a patent pool than it would spend in enforcement and
infringement actions or recoup in royalties.
Finally, patent pools are not the only way for companies to
realize the benefits of risk distribution and information exchange.
Some of the most notable, and profitable, patents in the biotechnology
realm are directed to various processes and technologies used for
biotechnology research. These patents cover the processes used in
recombinant DNA, polymerase chain reaction, and DNA sequencing
technologies. 19 Without these three techniques, it is arguable that the
biotechnology industry would not exist today. Every lab, whether it
is in a university, a biotechnology firm, or a pharmaceutical company
uses these processes in their biotechnology research.120 In looking at
these three technologies, an interesting point becomes clear: through
the use of traditional licensing and royalty schemes, the
biotechnology world had significant access to these patents. Nearly
every biotechnology interest was able to receive and use these patents
and did not need to expend resources duplicating the research efforts
of the patenting entities. 12 1 Traditional royalty schemes justify the
risks of development associated with the patents by covering the cost
122
associated with developing the processes and also yielding profits.
These examples show how typical licensing and royalty schemes can
yield the same advantages of risk distribution and information
exchange without the use of a patent pool.
VI. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY WILL HAVE DIFFICULTIES
OVERCOMING STANDARD PROBLEMS OF PATENT POOL
FORMATION

Before even considering the possible advantages, biotechnology
companies must first overcome multiple obstacles facing their
successful creation of patent pools. Traditionally, patent pools have
been discouraged due to their propensity for antitrust violations, cost
inflation, and collusion.123 Not only are modem biotechnology patent
pools susceptible to these same traditional antitrust concerns, but
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biotechnology companies must also overcome additional problems
unique to their industry when forming a patent pool.

A.

Biotechnology PatentPools are Susceptible to Traditional
Antitrust Concerns

Biotechnology patent pools must overcome the traditional
antitrust concerns of collusion, price fixing, and preserving invalid
patents. Companies that are normally competitors with one another
may instead decide to combine their
competitive patents, resulting in
124
an "anti-competitive" monopoly.
A modem day example of collusion through a patent pool
occurred with Summit Technology and VISX. 125
These two
companies held the competing patents necessary for producing the
machines for laser eye surgery.1 26 Both companies placed their
patents into a patent pool where every time a laser produced by the
patent pool was 27
used in an eye procedure, a $250 licensing fee was
1
paid to the pool.
In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission dissolved the patent pool
because it allowed the two companies to "raise, fix, stabilize and
maintain the price that physicians must pay to perform [laser eye
surgery] procedures. 1 28 This ruling was based on the fact that the
two companies would normally have been competitors, but for the
formation of a patent pool used to fix prices, the pool therefore
endangered competition in their field. 129 This case illustrates that,
while the government has been more accepting of patent pools as of
late (e.g., allowing such pools as the MPEG and DVD pools), it
reserves cautious optimism that patent pools will not lead to the
monopolies, collusion, or protection of invalid patents exemplified by
patent pools during the first half of the twentieth century.
The difference between the VISX and MPEG patent pools lies in
the perceived aims of the respective pools. Through the VISX patent
pool, its companies sought to preserve their monopoly over laser eye
surgery by fixing prices and placing restrictions on licensing the
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patent pool to others. 130 The MPEG pool, on the other hand, had less
restrictive policies on pricing and allowed any third party licensing
rights to the patent pool.'
Comparing these two pools demonstrates
that patent pools are again gaining acceptance and in some instances,
like the MPEG patent pool, can be advantageous. However, the
VISX patent pool provides a modem example of how, despite a
change in time, products, and acceptance, companies still try to use
patent pools as a means of impermissibly maintaining control over the
market.
Another traditional concern with patent pools stems from
attempts to preserve invalid patents. 132 Often, when a company is
faced with litigation and it is concerned that a court may find its
patent invalid, the company may propose forming a patent pool as a
settlement measure. Companies might find this an appealing solution
for maintaining patent rights and royalty streams which may
disappear if a court invalidates their patents.
A historical example of invalid patent preservation occurred in
the formation of the Association of Licensed Automobile
Manufacturers patent pool. 33 Like many other patent pools, it was
formed only after years of litigation had failed to settle disputes
between the eventual pool members. Here, the problem revolved
around George Seldon's broad patent which he claimed covered the
internal combustion engine.' 34
Many automobile manufacturers
questioned the validity of Seldon's patent and refused to pay royalties
for the use.' 3 5 Eventually, the auto manufacturers and Seldon agreed
to settle the dispute by forming an automobile patent pool which36
1
incorporated Seldon's patent and paid him subsequent royalties.
This case illustrates a traditional problem of patent pools: opting to
form a patent pool rather than pursuing litigation resulted in
maintained value and derived revenue from a possibly invalid patent.
Currently, many biotechnology companies resolve their
intellectual property issues via extensive litigation. 137 Such litigation
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between companies trying to prove infringement and invalidity of
each other's patents is often costly. 38 In using patent pools to settle
these claims, biotechnology companies may imitate the automotive
patent pool and settle for royalties from a patent pool rather than risk
patent invalidation. Biotechnology patent pools may therefore violate
antitrust laws by preserving potentially invalid patents. These cases
illustrate that, while the government has been more accepting of
patent pools, it nevertheless is still skeptical about the possible
creation of monopolies, collusion, or protection of invalid patents
resulting from the formation of patent pools.
B. The Biotechnology Industry Differs From Industries Which
Have Had Success With PatentPools
A closer look at several historical patent pools suggests that
biotechnology companies are not likely to form patent pools. The
USPTO white paper repeatedly cites the Manufacturer's Aircraft
Association as an example of a successful patent pool. 139 What made
this patent pool unique, however, is that it formed only after 10 years
of litigation and numerous disagreements between patent holders.
Not until the federal government, faced with the need for planes for
World War I, intervened and pressured the patent holders did they
finally form a patent pool. 140 Similarly, one of the first patent pools
for the automobile industry was formed only after numerous
disagreements and extensive litigation.' 41 In the aforementioned
historical examples, only when litigation failed to resolve the issues,
and the government intervened, did the companies form patent pools.
Such litigious activity and licensing impasses indicates that
companies are often more intent on producing a novel product
independently, or through licensing, and only use patent pools as a
last resort.
Moreover, many of the biotechnology companies are still trying
to assemble their necessary intellectual property rights without
resorting to the use of a patent pool. 142 Thus far, all biotechnology
products have reached the marketplace via extensive litigation, rather
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than rival companies pooling their resources. 143 If biotechnology
companies emulate earlier companies in other sectors in forming their
patent pools, biotechnology companies will not use patent pools until
litigation fails to settle problems. Furthermore, the companies
involved in biotechnology innovations can also overcome patent
bottlenecks by partnering with one another, consolidating via
mergers, and outright purchasing technology portfolios.1 44 With
numerous alternatives to patent pooling still open, biotechnology
companies are choosing traditional methods of getting products to the
marketplace or acquiring patent rights without the use of patent
pools. 145

Historically, government intervention has spurred patent pool
formation, but the government will not be able to exert as much
pressure on the biotechnology industry to form patent pools as it did
with the aircraft146 and semiconductor industries. 147 After 20 years,
$20 billion in annual revenue, over 100 products on the market, and
research being conducted throughout the country, the biotechnology
industry is no longer in its infant stages as were the earlier
industries. 148 Thus far, government pressure in the biotechnology
sector has been minimal and has only succeeded in placing a handful
of gene fragments into the public domain. 149 Only after the National
Institutes of Health collaborated with the Wellcome Trust to provide
significant backing for a public consortium did several
pharmaceutical companies agree to place any of their SNP sequences
into a public domain library. 50 While the consortium hopes to
eventually have a library of 300,000 SNP sequences placed in the
public domain, it has been a hard-won beginning toward that goal.15 1
Economists posit that the length of the relationship and the
homogeneity of pooling companies are indicators of the likelihood
companies will form a patent pool. 152
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Brothers and Curtiss Manufacturing had known of each other for over
a decade and both participated in a similar field with similar goals.
Their aircraft patent pool seems likely to succeed and appears to
validate some economists' conclusions about patent pools.153 Another
more recent patent pool containing companies who have known each
other for decades, as well as operating in similar fields, was the
54
MPEG-LA patent pool for the MPEG-2 compression standard.
This pool was an amalgam of the Trustees of Columbia University,
Fujitsu, General Instrument, Lucent Technologies, Matsushita
Electric Industrial, Mitsubishi Electric, Philips Electronics, Scientific
Atlanta, and Sony.155 All of these companies, with the exception of
Columbia University, have been around for several decades in a
similar industry and share a similar goal: to profit from electronic
products.
Biotechnology companies do not fulfill these requirements of
duration and similarity, thus, decreasing the likelihood they will form
successful patent pools in the future. The numerous forming, failing,
merging, and acquiring of biotechnology companies within the
industry lessens the chance of companies developing long-term
relationships with one another. Biotechnology patent holders and
applicants also range from universities to biotechnology companies,
pharmaceutical companies, and individuals, 5 6 representing a wide
diversity of sizes, pursuits, and products among various patent
holders. For example, a university and a pharmaceutical company
sharing a patent pool are likely to have widely differing ideas on the
cost third parties should pay to use the patent pool. 57 Consequently,
the odds are strongly against such entities forming a patent pool.
VII.

SUCCESSFUL PATENT FORMATION IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY

INDUSTRY ALSO FACES MANY UNIQUE DISADVANTAGES
Past trends and traditional problems aside, biotechnology
companies face additional practical considerations when forming a
successful patent pool.
Differing goals of pooling companies,
determining patent valuation, and the limited utility of the patent pool
uniquely plague patent pools when applied to the biotechnology
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industry. 1
A.

Biotechnology Companies Possess Many DisparateGoals

The diversity of entities involved in biotechnology suggests that
companies' goals within the sector would be equally disparate. For
instance, a university may wish to form a patent pool requiring no
royalties to encourage research of the patented genes, whereas the
pharmaceutical company, whose goal is mainly profit, might wish for
higher royalties. 159 Further compounding these differences are the
reasons which lead a company to join the patent pool. A company
which already possesses a large amount of pure research has little to
gain, and therefore, little incentive to join a patent pool where the
other patents in the pool are comprised of largely similar upstream
research. 60 Instead, a company, possessing volumes of preliminary
research, may forego the patent pool and seek profits directly from
companies wanting to purchase the rights to use this upstream
information in their own development. 161 Therefore, it would be
difficult to create a biotechnology patent pool that met the diverse
motivating factors and research needs of all the pool members.
B. UncertaintyExists Regarding the Valuation of Patents
Within a Patent Pool
In addition to the problem of finding parties to form the patent
pool, difficulties also arise over the valuation of the patents to be
added to the pool. 62 This issue stems from the uncertainty of the
utility and eventual importance of the patented DNA fragment. When
Human Genome Sciences (HGS) received the patent for the gene that
encodes CCR5 protein, they speculated it might be helpful in studying
various cancers. 63 Given that uncertainty, HGS would probably not
have valued the patent very highly when they placed it into a patent
pool because they were unsure of the CCR5 protein's utility.
However, after other independent research teams discovered that
CCR5 was an important protein in the fight against HIV and HGS
became eligible to collect royalties for AIDS drugs utilizing their
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CCR5 patent, HGS' valuation of that patent would surely increase.' 64
Such a valuation flux would be quite common in patent pools
When applying for patents, many
formed for biotechnology.
companies filed applications for various DNA fragments without a
definitive understanding of their utility and function.' 65 Without an
understanding of the eventual importance of a patent, it will be
difficult to arrive at an agreed valuation. Additionally, biotechnology
companies may tend to overvalue their patents in the pools since the
financial worth of many biotechnology66companies is primarily based
on their intellectual property portfolio.'
Highly valuable patents may also hinder a patent pool's
formation. Anticommons theorists also share the pessimistic view
that once a DNA fragment is found to be immensely valuable, it will
be extremely difficult to incorporate it into a patent pool. 167 A
pharmaceutical company possessing the patent on a gene or protein
responsible for its popular new drug will be unlikely to place such a
a readily accessible patent pool that competitors
valuable patent into
168
may also exploit.
C. Biotechnology PatentPools Are Not Applicable to a Wide
Array of Applications
Even if companies manage to overcome all of the obstacles to
forming a biotechnology based patent pool, the end result of their
effort would probably be of minimal value. In past patent pooling
successes, all of the patents were amassed for one similar end
product. For instance, the airline patent pool was used to manufacture
airplanes, or the MPEG patent pool to aid in storing and sending
digitized media. 169 Biotechnology patents do not lend themselves so
nicely to a mass-produced end product. 170 Therefore, the patent pool
formed by one group for work in a specific area of biotechnology
would be of little value to others in different parts of the industry. 171
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Conflicting patent rights hinder society from realizing the many
benefits which biotechnology can provide. The USPTO deserves
credit for exploring the feasibility of using patent pools to overcome
holdups like patent blocking and stacking. However, the history of
patent pools and unique nature of the current biotechnology industry
suggests patent pools cannot adequately solve the intellectual property
problems facing biotechnology.
The USPTO overestimates the benefits the biotechnology
industry will realize from patent pools. Even though biotechnology
companies forming patent pools might realize some inherent
advantages of patent pools, given the unique nature of the
biotechnology industry, these benefits will not be as a great as those
that other industries have realized through the use of patent pools.
Biotechnology companies must also consider if the traditional
benefits, when weighed against the numerous traditional and unique
problems, justify forming patent pools. The risks of collusion,
disagreements, high costs, and limited utility will prevent many patent
pools from being widely adopted by biotechnology companies.
Consequently, patent pools will not solve the intellectual property
rights problems facing the biotechnology industry.

